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过程。以 2016 年为例，过会的 265 家企业从申报到上市平均需要 862 天，其中






















































Chinese IPO firms have to go through a time-consuming process of examination 
before listed in the stock market. The average examining time of IPO firms that were 
approved in 2016 by Chinese Issuance Examination Committee (IEC) is 863 days. To 
some “unfortunate” IPO firms, this process could take 4 or 5 years. However, after such 
vigorous examination process, incidents such as IPO fraud scandals, severe profit 
decline, and mass resignations of top executives are comma in newly listed firms. This 
raises a question as to whether the issuance examination is effective and what is the 
relationship between IPO examination time and the phenomena mentioned above. 
Using a sample of 647 A-share private listed firms from the 2009 to 2012 period, 
this paper finds that firms experiencing a longer examination time show less profit 
decline, are less likely to violate law, and their top executives and block shareholders 
sell less shares. On the contrary, firms quickly passing the examination show serve 
profit decline, higher probability of violating the law, and their top executives and block 
shareholders sell more shares. Moreover, firms quickly passing the examination usually 
have a higher degree of earnings management, possess political connection or issuance 
examination committee connection. These results imply that the issuance examination 
is not perfectly effective. High quality IPO firms take a longer examining time to get 
listed, while low quality firms quickly passing the examination through earnings 
management, political connection or issuance examination committee connection, 
which can do damage to the long-run development of capital market.  
This paper has two contributions. The first one is the introduction of examination 
time, which has long been overlooked by studies on IPO firms, and this paper shows 
that examination time is not the signal of corporate quality but a sign of examination 
failure or rent-seeking. The second one is the finding of mechanisms of why low quality 
firms quickly pass the issuance examination, and this paper makes several suggestions 
on how to improve the examining system according to its findings. 
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年为例，过会的 265家企业从申报到上市平均需要 862天，其中主板企业 887天，
中小板企业 915 天，创业板企业 798 天，而对于少部分“不幸”的企业而言，审
核时间更是长达四五年之久1。上市最为坎坷的山东玲珑轮胎，从申报到发行总
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